Animations made from found images

Cassandra C. Jones (previously featured on BB Video makes collage animations and photos by assembling found images into new ones, like this tribute to Muybridge's horses, made from stock photos strung together in clever sequence.

Snap Motion Re-Animation (via Kottke)


  1. No thanks. Clever for maybe the first 6 flashes. Like doplgangr said, that one is definitely spew worthy.

  2. That’s quite cool… It would kill my epileptic friend, but that’s just like survival of the robustist brain or something…

  3. Seems apropos:

    Can it be that a white horse is not a horse?
    Advocate: It can.
    Objector: How?
    Advocate: “Horse” is that by means of which one names the shape. “White” is that by means of which one names the color. What names the color is not what names the shape. Hence, I say that a white horse is not a horse.
    Objector: If there are white horses, one cannot say that there are no horses. If one cannot say that there are no horses, doesn’t that mean that there are horses? For there to be white horses is for there to be horses. How could it be that the white ones are not horses?
    Advocate: If one wants a horse, that extends to a yellow or black horse. But if one wants a white horse, that does not extend to a yellow or black horse. Suppose that a white horse were a horse. Then what one wants [in the two cases] would be the same. If what one wants were the same, then a white [horse] would not differ from a horse. If what one wants does not differ, then how is it that a yellow or black horse is sometimes acceptable and sometimes unacceptable? It is clear that acceptable and unacceptable are mutually contrary. Hence, yellow and black horses are the same [in that, if there are yellow or black horses], one can respond that there are horses, but one cannot respond that there are white horses. Thus, it is evident that a white horse is not a horse.[1]

    The White Horse Dialogue (Baima Lun) constitutes chapter 2 of the eponymous Gongsun Longzi “Master Gongsun Long”, who was a leader in the “School of Names” (aka “Logicians” or “Dialecticians”) in the Hundred Schools of Thought. Most of Gongsun’s writings have been lost and the received Gongsun Longzi text only contains 6 of the supposedly 14 original chapters. Parts of the text are dislocated and some commentators and translators rearrange them for clarity. The dialogue is between two unnamed speakers.

  4. Or you could be even more obtuse:

    The horse paradox is a falsidical paradox that arises from flawed demonstrations, which purport to use mathematical induction, of the statement All horses are the same color. There is no actual contradiction, as these arguments have a crucial flaw that makes them incorrect. This example was used by George Pólya as an example of the subtle errors that can occur in attempts to prove statements by induction.

    The flawed argument claims to be based on mathematical induction, and proceeds as follows:

    Suppose that we have a set of five horses. We wish to prove that they are all the same color. Suppose that we had a proof that all sets of four horses were the same color. If that were true, we could prove that all five horses are the same color by removing a horse to leave a group of four horses. Do this in two ways, and we have two different groups of four horses. By our supposed existing proof, since these are groups of four, all horses in them must be the same color. For example, the first, second, third and fourth horses constitute a group of four, and thus must all be the same color; and the second, third, fourth and fifth horses also constitute a group of four and thus must also all be the same color. For this to occur, all five horses in the group of five must be the same color.

    But how are we to get a proof that all sets of four horses are the same color? We apply the same logic again. By the same process, a group of four horses could be broken down into groups of three, and then a group of three horses could be broken down into groups of two, and so on. Eventually we will reach a group size of one, and it is obvious that all horses in a group of one horse must be the same color.

    By the same logic we can also increase the group size. A group of five horses can be increased to a group of six, and so on upwards, so that all finite sized groups of horses must be the same color.

    The argument above makes the implicit assumption that the two subsets of horses to which the induction assumption is applied have a common element. This is not true when n = 1, that is, when the original set only contains 2 horses.

    Let the two horses be horse A and horse B. When horse A is removed, it is true that the remaining horses in the set are the same color (only horse B remains). If horse B is removed instead, this leaves a different set containing only horse A, which may or may not be the same color as horse B.

    The problem in the argument is the assumption that because each of these two sets contains only one color of horses, the original set also contained only one color of horses. Because there are no common elements (horses) in the two sets, it is unknown whether the two horses share the same color. The proof forms a falsidical paradox; it seems to show something manifestly false by valid reasoning, but in fact the reasoning is flawed. The horse paradox exposes the pitfalls arising from failure to consider special cases for which a general statement may be false.

  5. Regarding the rather confusing Chinese conversation, I always thought it tied in nicely with Plato’s Theory of Forms.

    The English word “form” may be used to translate two distinct concepts with which Plato was concerned—the outward “form” or appearance of something , and “Form” in a new, technical nature, that never

    …assumes a form like that of any of the things which enter into her; … But the forms which enter into and go out of her are the likenesses of real existences modelled after their patterns in a wonderful and inexplicable manner….

    The objects that we see, according to Plato, are not real, but literally mimic the real Forms. In the allegory of the cave expressed in Republic, the things we ordinarily perceive in the world are characterized as shadows of the real things, which we do not perceive directly. That which the observer understands when he views the world mimics the archetypes of the many types and properties (that is, of universals) of things we see all around us.

    Different source talking about horses:

    Plato deduced that we were living in the “sensory” world where everything was like a gingerbread man product of the “ideal” product, the perfect product. He said that the “ideal” horse came first, then came all the sensory world’s horses, which weren’t perfect, as he explains in his famous Cave. …
    Aristotle though Plato had it upside down. He agreed with his mentor that the horse doesn’t change or “flow” and that all horses are imperfect and mortal, and he agreed that the basic form of the horse is eternal. But he argued that the “idea” horse is just a concept that humans had come up with after seeing a lot of horses. Aristotle said that the “idea” or, as he liked to put it, the “form” horse was made up of the horse’s characteristics, which we call the species. In modern science, we have discovered deoxyribonucleic acid (or DNA), which we have found, controls the characteristics of every living plant and animal. This is the “form” horse that Aristotle was explaining.

    Why do really old philosphers have such a thing for the idea of a horse? I don’t hear people talking about the idea of cars, unless they are advertisers.

  6. I remember something from the National Film Board of Canada, which had similar footage of models running along beaches taken from ads. It showed in a very haunting way irrelevant the actual people are to them. I am not quite able to find the name, though.

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