This is not limited to planes: now you see cars with HUDs, systems that automatically turn on blinking lights when you change lanes, collision radars and so on. 

The other day I was watching a documentary about the Lofoten Islands, in Norway, one of the most dangerous coast there is (that’s where you find the infamous Maelstrom). There are many lighthouses there, that are not permanently manned anymore. People go there regularly to check on systems and one was asked whether this whole setup is necessary anymore, what with everyone using GPS. And the guy answered: “And what happens when you’re at sea, at night and during a storm, and your GPS breaks down?” Because it WILL break down, usually at the worst moment. And the scariest part is, most of the people are so used to their GPS they mightn’t be able to navigate by view well enough anymore…

2) The pitot tubes are heated – but the ones on AF443 were a bad design (search for “thales pitot” for more info). They were supposed to be replaced at the next major maintenance check – but that didn’t quite happen.

Basic rule -  avoid bad weather, don’t needless test your aircraft/crew system.

Petroski’s book is good too.

http://www.amazon.com/Engineer-Human-Failure-Successful-Design/dp/0679734163/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1323474741&sr=8-1

2) Why aren’t the pitot tubes thermostatically heated to prevent icing over?

Do note, though, that “just a theory” isn’t really accurate, nor is “it ain’t proven.”  This is science, so theory is a goal in itself, and no theory is ever proved.  That’s not what we do.

What struck me in the article was the asynchronous “joystick” / yoke controls.  With one pilot pulling back the other stick did not have the same reaction (as we would expect having watched dozens of airliner movies over the years).  This lack of a “tactile” alert could have been the difference between life and death.  Had the other pilot noticed “which is this control stick all the way back” the corrections could have taken place far earlier.
I think about this in more advanced systems–sort of that “last chance” kind of option that defies computer programming and is something rendered in an old fashion, more blunt force way.  Anyone who has driven in mountains often notices pulls off filled with gravel (runaway truck stops).  A “trip cock” on a train system that engages the brakes should a signal be passed.  Sometimes a simple option isn’t necessarily a bad option.

Anyway, a very important read.  Very tense.  

Other times, so many things are broken it’s tempting to just throw it back and ask for a working version. Gotta have a real good reason to do that, though :)

1. Attitude indicator : Like the Russians use on Soyuz spacecraft as a backup. Simply a mass (mascot in the Soyuz case) on string in the cockpit.  If it points down you are level.  Leans back you are climbing ,leans forward = decent, sits on the roof = you are inverted! The plane equivalent to fluffy dice.

2. Speed indicator: Simple deforming spring outside the pilot and co-pilot’s windows that deforms visibly with airspeed.  Some funky colour visible day/night. Not hyper accurate given its position on the surface but enough to give a rough order of airspeed.  The pilots with time will associate its behaviour with the known airspeeds they use when the systems are all working well. When they disagree the pilot will notice. If the cockpit goes black it still works.

This way you have a non avionic backup indication of these two things to refer against when all the alarms and buzzers go off.

It could have been something simple yet obvious, like cockpit lights changing to alternate colors.

Ha! I was thinking the exact same thing while I read the article.

In the air, what do you expect? Is the pilot supposed to know how to immediately repair every minute failure of the aircraft? A pilot is not an engineer or mechanic, he’s a pilot. 

How many survivable mechanical failures occur, what are the numbers? How do we plan on training every pilot on how to repair every on conceivable  unforeseeable mechanical issue, especially if they may not happen in his/her entire flight career. That’s why we have “preventative maintenance”. The inspections/repairs are the only realistic safeguards for any mode of travel. 

Let us take “Running Out of Fuel” (highest probability)
Landcraft: You come to a gradual rolling stop.
Watercraft: Climate an issue, drift, grounding, sinking,  drop anchor/parachute anchor if possible,  rescue may not be immediate. (preparation for these scenarios are law)
Not all Aircraft responds the same: 
>Jet: Crash or glide to a safe landing
>Rocket: Catastrophic
>Helicopter: Catastrophic
>Blip/Balloon: Slow decent, landing spot an issue, hard landing. The automobile industry realizes this too.

My Dodge’s p0455 (cycle key a few time when check engine light come on) directs me to a few possibilities:  ( per http://www.obd-codes.com/p0455 ) Evaporative Emission Control System Leak Detected (no purge flow or large leak). This indicates a fuel vapor leak or lack of purge flow in the EVAP control system. It means a large leak has been detected. The (EVAP) emission control system prevents the escape of fuel vapors from a vehicle’s fuel system. Fuel vapors are routed by hoses to a charcoal canister for storage. Later, when the engine is running a purge control valve opens allowing intake vacuum to siphon the fuel vapors into the engine.

With a p0455, the most common repair is to: Remove and reinstall the gas cap, clear the codes, and drive for a day and see if the codes come back. Otherwise, replace the gas cap, and/or Inspect the EVAP system for cuts/holes in tubes/hoses (you may hear a vacuum noise or smell fuel), repair if necessary. (it’s always been the cap)

My Dodges p0455 code is somewhat of a luxury code, I have time to address it later and can continue using my vehicle. 

Any kind of plane cannot operate with this type of warning system. So it has to be specific because certain malfunctions have  to be attended to immediately. 

Ever take anything apart, put it back together and have one screw left? If it’s a plane, you’re not taking off.

 As the PM’s writer Jeff Wise obviously knows, the “tunnel effect’ where your perceptions narrow, would perhaps kick in in this situation. Robert could technically probably see Bonin’s movements of pulling the stick back but with narrowed perceptions and a focus on the airspeed indicators, he may have lost that visual input. But with a dual yoke system he would still feel it and not have to look to know Bonin was doing the wrong thing.

What I like about the study of this tragedy is that people are looking a the whole system so they can deal with both design issues, technology issues and human issues.

 Think about how many times when there are situations where the wrong input or the misunderstanding of the input leads to tragedy.  If you can fix those they you still have to deal with when people irrationally (or willfully) do the wrong thing.

Bonin’s irrational choices were not fed to either Robert or the Captain until too late.  Failure in communication, via the yoke system or words, is also a big part of the problem.

For example, why would there be an audible and persistent stall warning if the plane’s “normal law” would never let a stall happen? It seems like the warning should have been reserved for “alternate law”. That created a situation where a so-called warning was actually meaningless and increased confusion and stress.

No feedback between the yokes seems like another major design flaw. And shockingly there wasn’t any mention of an overt indicator that the plane switched between normal and alternate law. It could have been something simple yet obvious, like cockpit lights changing to alternate colors. Think submarine movies where the control room lights switch to red during combat mode.

I’m hoping Airbus has fixed these flaws. This crash does show how carefully thought out every system needs to be in all conditions.

Sounds a lot like spending $57B on useless terrorist protection….

They might not need a complete rundown of everything that’s going wrong but they need at least a little bit of context.  Otherwise pilots will train themselves not to pull up even when pulling up is the correct thing to do.