"atm skimmer

Chip-and-PIN is broken

Noted security researcher Ross Anderson and colleagues have published a paper showing how "Chip-and-PIN" (the European system for verifying credit- and debit-card transactions) has been thoroughly broken and cannot be considered secure any longer. I remember hearing rumbles that this attack was possible even as Chip-and-PIN was being rolled out across Europe, but that didn't stop the banks from pushing ahead with it, spending a fortune in the process.
The flaw is that when you put a card into a terminal, a negotiation takes place about how the cardholder should be authenticated: using a PIN, using a signature or not at all. This particular subprotocol is not authenticated, so you can trick the card into thinking it's doing a chip-and-signature transaction while the terminal thinks it's chip-and-PIN. The upshot is that you can buy stuff using a stolen card and a PIN of 0000 (or anything you want). We did so, on camera, using various journalists' cards. The transactions went through fine and the receipts say "Verified by PIN".

It's no surprise to us or bankers that this attack works offline (when the merchant cannot contact the bank) -- in fact Steven blogged about it here last August.

But the real shocker is that it works online too: even when the bank authorisation system has all the transaction data sent back to it for verification. The reason why it works can be quite subtle and convoluted: bank authorisation systems are complex beasts, including cryptographic checks, account checks, database checks, and interfaces with fraud detection systems which might apply a points-scoring system to the output of all the above.

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ATM skimmers: man, these things are scary

Brian Krebs continues to scare the pants off of me with his ongoing series on sophisticated ATM skimmers (devices that capture your card number, working with a hidden camera to catch your PIN). His slideshow of next-gen skimmers has me convinced that there's no way I'd notice a skimmer on an ATM that I was using: "According to Doten, the U.S. Secret Service estimates that annual losses from ATM fraud totaled about $1 billion in 2008, or about $350,000 each day. Card skimming, where the fraudster affixes a bogus card reader on top of the real reader, accounts for more than 80 percent of ATM fraud, Doten said."

ATM Skimmers, Part II Previously: ATM card skimmer in real life -- Boing Boing Gadgets ATM skimmer -- could you spot it in the wild? Read the rest

ATM skimmer -- could you spot it in the wild?

Brian Krebs's "Krebs on Security" features an ATM skimmer that is chillingly well-camouflaged. After seeing photos of early, crude skimmers -- devices that capture your card number and work in concert with a hidden camera that records you punching in your PIN -- I assumed that I could rely on my own powers of observation to keep from falling victim to one. Now I don't think I can be so sanguine. Be sure to follow some of the links in the post for some hair-raising examples of the form.
This particular skimmer was found Dec. 6, 2009, attached to the front of a Citibank ATM in Woodland Hills, Calif. Would you have been able to spot this?

This is fairly professional job: Notice how the bulk of the electronics fit into the flap below the card acceptance slot. Also, check out the tiny pinhole camera (pictured below), ostensibly designed to switch on and record the victim's movements as he or she enters their PIN at the ATM.

Would You Have Spotted the Fraud? (via Neatorama) Previously:Mouse nesting in ATM Boing Boing African ATM offers eight languages - Boing Boing Boing Boing: Fake ATM receipts for sale Citibank PIN/ATM fiasco "worst ever," involves more banks - Boing ... UK ATM cards' chips defeated with discount airfares - Boing Boing Ripoff: Visa/Mastercard's "Foreign transaction fee" - Boing Boing Boing Boing: Crook reprograms ATM in PA to think $20s are $1s Read the rest

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