The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") announced a Notice of Proposed Rule Making ("NPRM") that would "ban employers from imposing noncompetes on their workers, a widespread and often exploitative practice that suppresses wages, hampers innovation, and blocks entrepreneurs from starting new businesses." The FTC estimates that 1 in 5 American workers (approximately 30 million people) are bound by non-compete clauses.
California; North Dakota; Oklahoma; and Washington, D.C., ban noncompete agreements with a few narrow exceptions. Colorado, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, New Hampshire, Oregon, Rhode Island, Virginia and Washington state prohibit noncompete agreements unless the worker earns above a certain threshold. Multistate employers need to be aware of the changing legal obligations.
More States Block Noncompete Agreements | SHRM
Recent non-compete bans and limited prohibitions by a growing number of states have provided research opportunities to identify the effect non-compete clauses pose to American workers, which form the basis for the FTC's NPRM.
The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) published today carefully reviews the empirical evidence available to date and highlights several key findings.
First, noncompete clauses reduce competition in labor markets, suppressing earnings and opportunity even for workers who are not directly subject to a noncompete. When workers subject to noncompete clauses are blocked from switching to jobs in which they would be better paid and more productive, unconstrained workers in that market are simultaneously denied the opportunity to replace them. This collective decline in job mobility means fewer job offers and an overall drop in wages, as firms have less incentive to compete for workers by offering higher pay, better benefits, greater say over scheduling, or more favorable conditions. The FTC estimates that the proposed ban on noncompetes would increase workers' total earnings by close to $300 billion per year.
Second, the existing evidence indicates that noncompete clauses reduce innovation and competition in product and service markets. Studies show that locking workers in place reduces innovation, likely by decreasing the flow of information and knowledge among firms. By preventing workers from starting their own businesses and limiting the pool of talent available for startups to hire, noncompetes also limit entrepreneurship and new business formation. This in turn reduces product quality while raising prices. Indeed, existing evidence from the health care sector suggests that the proposed ban would decrease consumer prices, potentially to the tune of $150 billion a year.
Statement of Chair Lina M. Khan Joined by Commissioner Rebecca Kelly Slaughter and Commissioner Alvaro M. Bedoya Regarding the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to Restrict Employers' Use of Noncompete Clauses
Subchapter J—Rules Concerning Unfair Methods of Competition
Part 910—Non-Compete Clauses
§ 910.1 Definitions.(a) Business entity means a partnership, corporation, association, limited liability company, or other legal entity, or a division or subsidiary thereof.
(b) Non-compete clause.
(1) Non-compete clause means a contractual term between an employer and a worker that prevents the worker from seeking or accepting employment with a person, or operating a business, after the conclusion of the worker's employment with the employer.
(2) Functional test for whether a contractual term is a non-compete clause. The term non-compete clause includes a contractual term that is a de facto non-compete clause because it has the effect of prohibiting the worker from seeking or accepting employment with a person or operating a business after the conclusion of the worker's employment with the employer. For example, the following types of contractual terms, among others, may be de facto non-compete clauses:
i. A non-disclosure agreement between an employer and a worker that is written so broadly that it effectively precludes the worker from working in the same field after the conclusion of the worker's employment with the employer.
ii. A contractual term between an employer and a worker that requires the worker to pay the employer or a third-party entity for training costs if the worker's employment terminates within a specified time period, where the required payment is not reasonably related to the costs the employer incurred for training the worker.
(c) Employer means a person, as defined in 15 U.S.C. 57b-1(a)(6), that hires or contracts with a worker to work for the person.
(d) Employment means work for an employer, as the term employer is defined in paragraph (c) of this section.
(e) Substantial owner, substantial member, and substantial partner mean an owner, member, or partner holding at least a 25 percent ownership interest in a business entity.
(f) Worker means a natural person who works, whether paid or unpaid, for an employer. The term includes, without limitation, an employee, individual classified as an independent contractor, extern, intern, volunteer, apprentice, or sole proprietor who provides a service to a client or customer. The term worker does not include a franchisee in the context of a franchisee-franchisor relationship; however, the term worker includes a natural person who works for the franchisee or franchisor. Non-compete clauses between franchisors and franchisees would remain subject to Federal antitrust law as well as all other applicable law.
Non-Compete Clause Rulemaking | FTC
The NPRM is the first step towards making a new rule, and the FTC invites the pubic to submit comments which will be used to make changes to the final rule. Topics broached by the FTC include:
First, should the rule apply different standards to noncompetes that cover senior executives or other highly paid workers? As the NPRM notes, these workers may be less vulnerable to coercion, but restraining them through noncompetes may still harm competition— for example, by making it harder and more expensive for potential entrants to recruit individuals for leadership positions. I am keen for input on this question, including on how any such category of workers should be defined and what standards should be applied. For example, if the Commission were to adopt a "rebuttable presumption" of illegality for noncompetes affecting these workers, what showing should be required to overcome the presumption?
Second, should the rule cover noncompetes between franchisors and franchisees? The current proposal does not cover noncompetes used by franchisors to restrict franchisees, but we recognize that in some cases they may raise concerns that are analogous to those raised by noncompetes between employers and workers. We welcome the public's views on this topic, as well as data or other evidence that could inform our consideration of this issue.
Third, what tools other than noncompetes might employers use to protect valuable investments, and how sufficient are these alternatives? The proposal identifies several potential mechanisms that employers may use—including trade secrets law and confidentiality agreements—and we preliminarily find that these alternatives reasonably achieve the goal of protecting investments without unduly burdening competition. We welcome feedback on the Commission's preliminary analysis of this issue.
Statement of Chair Lina M. Khan Joined by Commissioner Rebecca Kelly Slaughter and Commissioner Alvaro M. Bedoya Regarding the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to Restrict Employers' Use of Noncompete Clauses
